PLA's Xining Joint Logistics Unit Avoids Mentioning "Chairman Xi"

Image: A Chinese military canine and demolition unit conducting a security sweep at Tiananmen Square. (Photo by Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)

[People News] In previous articles, such as "The 78th Army Inspected by Xi Jinping Avoids Mentioning 'Chairman Xi'" and "Does the Beijing Garrison Still Pledge Loyalty to Xi Jinping?" the author highlighted unusual omissions in public statements by the Chinese military. Terms like "Xi Jinping Thought" and the "Two Establishments" were frequently disregarded, and references to "Chairman Xi" and the "Chairman Responsibility System of the Central Military Commission" were downplayed. These observations further corroborate a significant development: a major internal event has indeed occurred within the upper echelons of the CCP, leading to the erosion or weakening of Xi Jinping's control over military and even Party authority.

On November 28, a report from the PLA Daily and the military's official website offered further evidence of the shifts within the CCP. The report's subtitle read, "A Base Under the Xining Joint Logistics Support Center Deepens the Study and Implementation of the Spirit of the Central Military Commission’s Political Work Conference," while the main title was "Boost Morale, Serve the Main Battle, and Ensure Victory." However, based on the report's content, the idea that the CCP's outdated logistical support could secure victory in modern warfare seems highly unrealistic. What stands out, though, is the complete absence of any mention of "Chairman Xi" throughout the article.

This omission is significant. The Central Military Commission’s Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) was established in September 2016 to implement joint logistical support and strategic operational support. The JLSF, directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC), operates at the deputy theater command level. Its headquarters is in Wuhan, with five regional logistics support centers located in Wuxi, Guilin, Xining, Shenyang, and Zhengzhou, corresponding to the five theater commands: Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central.

At its inception, Xi Jinping, as CMC Chairman, personally presented the military flags and delivered instructions to the Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base and the regional centers in Wuxi, Guilin, Xining, Shenyang, and Zhengzhou.

However, comparisons with the JLSF's response to the CMC Work Conference in June reveal stark differences. On June 23, the PLA Daily published a report titled "Continuously Strengthening the Political Advantage of Our Army in New Era Conditions," describing how various military departments, including the CMC agencies, joint command centers, theater commands, military branches, and paramilitary forces, responded enthusiastically to the study of Xi Jinping's speeches. The report was filled with praise, describing Xi’s speeches as having "profound political foresight, immense truth-based strength, and strong mission-oriented guidance." It also referred to his speeches as "programmatic documents for ideological Party-building and political military-building in the new era."

At that time, the JLSF was explicitly mentioned. One unit's officers and soldiers participated in discussions about Xi's so-called political military-building strategies, referred to as the "Ten Clarifications." Their language was filled with flattery, describing these strategies as "mutually connected, logically rigorous, richly connotative, and comprehensively systematic," claiming that they "systematically addressed the major directional, fundamental, and overarching issues of Party-commanded military governance under new era conditions."

Another report on June 22 described how Xi's speeches had sparked widespread enthusiasm across the military. Flattering terms such as "possessing strong political leadership, intellectual penetration, and practical guidance" were used extensively. The JLSF leadership also demonstrated their loyalty in this report. Mentions of "Xi Jinping Thought," "Xi Jinping's Thought on Strengthening the Military," the "Two Establishments," the "Two Safeguards," and the "CMC Chairman Responsibility System" were abundant.

However, just five months later, the responses to similar speeches have shown significant changes across military branches. Such changes are clearly not initiated by Xi Jinping himself; after all, he would have no reason to undermine his position as the "supreme leader." The only plausible explanation is that, following Xi's rumored stroke in July, he is no longer the top authority in the military. Under the leadership of CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, supported by several senior CCP figures who appeared or were notably absent during the October festivities, military authority has shifted. Zhang appears to have gained control of the military and is working to reshape the narrative, steering the armed forces away from pledging sole allegiance to Xi Jinping.

Such shifts in military statements require time, which explains the peculiar phenomenon observed in the PLA Daily and on military websites: on the one hand, Xi Jinping's news still dominates the headlines; on the other hand, statements from various branches of the military are increasingly downplaying references to "Chairman Xi." Although some recent PLA Daily reports on CMC-issued documents have deliberately included terms like "Xi Thought" to create a misleading impression, the true intent is to obscure the ongoing changes within the military. In reality, the evolving statements from the various military branches reveal the true nature of what is happening within the armed forces. The trend of avoiding mentions of "Chairman Xi" and downplaying his role is likely to continue until the CCP leadership fully exposes the internal dynamics and unveils the broader truth behind these developments. △

(First published by People News)